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The Origins of the Monroe Doctrine Revisited:
The Madison Administration, the West Florida
Revolt, and the No Transfer Policy
by William S. Belko
ate in October of 1810, as citizens and statesmen
throughout the United States focused almost entirely on
an imminent conflict with Great Britain and apprehensively
monitored Napoleon's armies in Europe, the president of the
United States, James Madison, quickly convened an emergency
session of his cabinet members. Great Britain and Napoleon were
not, however, the reason for calling the secret cabinet meeting.
What occupied the attention of the executive branch was a little
recognized rebellion in a sparsely populated region south of the
Mississippi Territory. Two days after secretly conferring with his
cabinet, on October 27, Madison issued a pivotal presidential
proclamation authorizing the U. S. occupation of the territory
below the official U. S. border with Spanish Florida-the 31st
parallel-and extending from the Mississippi River eastward to
the Perdido River. Just weeks earlier, in late September of 1810,
rebellious citizens, mostly recent American immigrants to the
Baton Rouge area, declared their independence from Spain and
dubbed themselves the West Florida Republic-the original Lone
Star Republic. Within days of their precipitous declaration, the
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rebels requested the protection of and annexation by the United
States. President Madison, motivated by a number of "weighty and
urgent considerations," deemed it "right and requisite" that the
United States accept that invitation, and, accordingly, the Virginian
unilaterally ordered the governor of the Orleans Territory, William
C. C. Claiborne, to mobilize the territorial militia and enter into
and exercise over the newly acquired region the "authorities and
functions legally pertaining to his office." Under the protection
of the United States, the "good people" of the liberated Spanish
territory were thus "invited and enjoined to pay due respect" to the
new governor, and "to be obedient, to maintain order, to cherish
harmony, and in every manner to conduct themselves as peaceable
citizens, under full assurance that they will be protected in the
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion."'
Few Americans know of this seemingly obscure presidential
action seizing the "boot heels" of the present states of Alabama and
Mississippi and the state of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River from
Baton Rouge to the Pearl River. But Madison's actions, taken only
seven years after the Louisiana Purchase and nine years prior to the
U. S. acquisition of all of Spanish Florida, initiated one of the more
consequential territorial acquisitions in American history. Indeed,
Madison's ostensibly innocuous exploit provided the ideological
foundation and the diplomatic justification for future annexation of
foreign territory, from Spanish Florida in 1818 to nearly all of Mexico
in 1848, and ultimately Alaska, Hawaii and Cuba in the late nineteenth
century. The pivotal policy which Madison ultimately handed
the United States-the No Transfer policy-served as an integral
ingredient of the famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823, and beginning
with the post-Civil War era, became a prominent component of U. S.
foreign policy extending well into the twentieth century.
As soon as Madison assumed the presidency in March of 1809,
activities and intrigues in Spanish Florida, and throughout the
entire Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere for that matter,
attracted the attention of the U.S. government. From 1801 to 1809,
President Thomas Jefferson had undertaken a rather confused and
inconsistent foreign policy in relation to the region separating the
United States from the Gulf of Mexico east of the Mississippi River.
His secretary of state, James Madison, was intimately involved in
r
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Madison to 11 ' h Congress, October 27, 1810, in James D. Richardson, ed. , A
Compilation of the M essages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), 1: 480-81.
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the diplomacy with Spain concerning the Floridas. Both Virginians
claimed West Florida as part of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, a
sentiment commonly shared by most American statesmen, and they
pursued East Florida as recompense for existing spoliation claims
against Spain resulting from the quasi-war with France during
the late 1790s. Jefferson and Madison focused on the acquisition
of Spanish Florida from 1803 until the crisis with Great Britain
assumed the administration's full attention in 1807. There the
matter rested until Madison became president in March of 1809. 2
Within weeks of taking office as president, Madison received
correspondence that brought Spanish West Florida to his
attention. The seedy U. S. General James Wilkinson-also known
as Spanish Agent No. 13-met with the governor of Spanish West
Florida, Vincente Folch, while the latter visited New Orleans in
late April of 1809. According to Wilkinson, Folch declared that
West Florida should be transferred to the United States if France
assumed complete control over Spain, that he had asked the
Spanish Junta for permission to transfer possession, and that, if
the Junta collapsed in the wake of Napoleon's invasion of Iberia,
he would formally ask the United States to take possession of the
territory. Wilkinson also informed the Madison administration that
U.S. troops at Fort Adams, in the Mississippi Territory, "will be held
in readiness" to march into West Florida "on the shortest notice,"
and that he would take command of the Tombigbee River "should
any foreign force land at Pensacola or Mobile," and thereby "drive
every hoof from that quarter." The American general then asked
for guidance in the case of two events: "Pt.- if the Governor of
West Florida, should call on me, formally, for succor or protection,
what am I to do? 2dly.-If the Governor and government should
be demolished, either by an usurpation of Spanish subjects, or by
enterprise of the American settlers, what course am I to pursue?" 3
2.

3.

Clifford L. Egan, "The United States, France, and West Florida, 1803-1807," Florida
Historical Quarterly 47 (1968-1969): 227-52; FrankL. Owsley and Gene A. Smith ,
Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1997) , 7-31; Wa~ohi Waciuma, Interoention in Spanish
Floridas, 1801-1813: A Study in Jeffersonian Foreign Poluy (Boston: Branden Press,
1976), 11-98.
Wilkinson to Madison, May 1, 1809, in Robert A. Rutland, ed., The Papers of
James Madison: Presidential Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962),
1:155-56, hereinafter cited as Madison Papers; Wilkinson to William Eustis, May
12 and 18, 1809, in James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Own Times (Philadelphia:
Abraham Small, 1816), 2: 350, 351, 357.
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If Madison responded, no correspondence exists, but evidence
of the administration's initial position regarding West Florida can
be gleaned from an official dispatch from Secretary of State Robert
Smith to U.S. Minister to France John Armstrong. Smith stated that
the United States would in no way be restrained from "interposing
in any manner that may be necessary" to prevent West Florida,
which the U. S. government "claimed under the Convention"
with France in 1803, from "being reduced under the possession
of another belligerent power." Yet, despite the absence of formal
instructions to Wilkinson, the Madison administration expected
the general to "avail himself of every proper occasion" to remove
any impression of U. S. hostility to "Spanish colonies" and to relay
always the pacific intentions and strict neutrality of the United
States in regard to Spanish American affairs. Neither Wilkinson
nor anyone else had been instructed or authorized to intermeddle
in any shape or form with the internal affairs of the local Spanish
authority, nor were they to violate in any way U.S. neutrality. At this
point, Madison called for caution and nonintervention regarding
West Florida. 4
Wilkinson, however, was not the only prominent official
contacting the Madison administration about events along the
Florida border during the spring of 1809. The same intelligence
came from a more trusted source, the Governor of the Orleans
Territory and staunch Jeffersonian Republican, William C. C.
Claiborne. The former Tennessee congressman informed the
Madison administration in March of 1809, nearly six weeks before
Wilkinson sent his correspondence off to Washington, that he
had a conversation with two Spanish officers who stated that the
Floridas were to be ceded to the United States as a consequence
of the French conquest of Spain. "These Gentlemen talked, as if
they were fully advised on the subject, and from the tenor of their
conversation, I considered the sentiments delivered were those of
Governor Folch, and with his assent, were communicated to me,"
Claiborne confided. "When speaking of East and West Florida, it
was observed, that detached as they were from the other Spanish
provinces, they were unimportant possessions, and ought and
would be ceded to the U. States," and that such was "the opinion of
4.

Smith to Armstrong, May 1, 1809, in William R. Manning, ed., Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925) , 1: 3-4, hereinafter cited as
Diplomatic Correspondence.
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Governor Folch." The following month, Claiborne met with Folch
himself near Baton Rouge, where the Spanish governor "freely
and without reserve" revealed his intention to cede the Floridas to
the United States. According to Claiborne, Folch believed that the
Floridas "were alone important to the U. States" and must "from
the course of things, fall very soon into their possession." Still,
Madison maintained a position of strict neutrality and refused to
meddle in the affairs of Spanish America. Actual U.S. possession of
West Florida, or of all the Floridas, would have to wait. 5
But as 1809 turned into 1810, pressure to intervene in West
Florida persisted, and this time it arrived from American quarters,
not Spanish. In February of 1810, the territorial delegate from
Mississippi, George Poindexter, presented to the U. S. House of
Representatives a memorial from the citizens of the Mississippi
Territory "complaining of the enormous duty levied by the Spanish
Government on vessels navigating the Mobile." They believed that
the executive possessed the authority to remedy this evil and they
wished to know what, if any, steps had been taken on this subject.
The House promptly formed a committee to await Madison's
response about any actions taken to achieve the free navigation of
the Mobile River to its confluence with the Gulf ofMexico. 6
The Madison administration promptly responded. Secretary of
State Smith informed the House that in 1801 and 1802, President
Jefferson "endeavored to obtain" for U. S. citizens residing along
the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers the free navigation of the Mobile
River to the Gulf of Mexico, "first by claiming this navigation as a
natural right, sanctioned by the law of nations applicable to rivers
similarly situated," and, secondly, by "endeavoring to purchase
the country held by Spain on the Mobile." Smith reiterated the
American claim to the region based on the Louisiana Purchase,
but stated that the Spanish government had objected to this claim
in a manner which 'justified a belief that the question would not
be soon decided," and thus the U. S. minister to Spain had been
instructed to secure from Spain free access to the Mobile River
and a reduction of the duties levied on American commerce. No
other avenues would be entertained. At this juncture, Madison
5.

6.

Claiborne to Smith, March 19, April 21, May 14, 1809, in Dunbar Rowland,
ed., Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816 Uackson: Mississippi
Department of Archives and History, 1917), 4: 332-33, 342-44, 351-54,
hereinafter cited as Letter Books.
Annals of Congress, Jl'h Cong., 2d sess., 1257.
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preferred negotiation with European powers and a policy of strict
neutrality regarding the Southern borderlands region . Patience
and prudence, diplomacy and deliberation, characterized the
Madison administration's West Florida policy. An approaching
conflict with Great Britain justifiably consumed the president's
greatest attention throughout his first two years in office, and,
thusly, any machinations, official or unofficial, to acquire the
Floridas remained on the backburner. 7
Events at home and abroad, however, quickly forced Madison's
hand, ultimately convincing the president to change drastically his
West Florida policy and adopt a new strategy-one that entailed
considerably more controversial tactics, one that involved the
administration in distasteful clandestine activities, and one that
intensified international rivalry and brought the country to the
brink of war. Conflict rather than peace characterized the new West
Florida policy, and rapid and forceful unilateral action replaced
calculated and friendly negotiation. Events unfolding thousands of
miles from U.S. shores compelled Madison to rethink his approach
to West Florida during the spring of 1810, as the impending
collapse of the Spanish empire precipitated an international
crisis that increasingly concerned U. S. national security. As
Napoleon's control over Spain tightened and the exiled Spanish
Junta crumbled, revolutions throughout the Spanish colonies of
the Western Hemisphere spawned independence movements
from South America to Mexico. Obviously, the disintegration of
Spain's American empire affected the Floridas, where Spain's
grip proved the weakest and where U. S. interests continued to
increase. When the Madison administration read in the columns of
its own organ, the National Intelligencer, the official proclamations
of Venezuela independence that had arrived from Caracas in early
June of 1810, the wheels of policy change were put into motion.
Rumors of discontent and grumblings among the inhabitants of
West Florida simultaneously reached the Madison administration,
7.

AnnalsofCongress, ll'h Cong., 2d sess., 1404-05, 1443. In April ofl810, Tennessee
congressman Robert Weakley presented two memorials from the citizens of his
state "praying that such measures may be adopted by the General Government
as will secure to them the free and unmolested navigation of the Mobile and
Tombigbee rivers, of which they are now deprived by the interposition of
Indians, through whose country the said rivers run; and that provision may be
made for extinguishing the Indian title to so much of the country adjacent to
those rivers as is necessary for settlements for the protection of boats passing
up and down the same." Annals of Congress, 11'11 Cong., 2d sess., 1761.
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adding to Washington's rising consternation over the crumbling
Spanish empire and further heightening anxiety over U. S.
national security throughout the Southern frontier. International
_considerations combined with border concerns to spur Madison's
change of policy regarding West Florida. 8
The president seized the opportunity in June of 1810. He
met at the executive mansion with Claiborne, who had come to
Washington on separate business. Already a chief proponent of
American acquisition of all of West Florida, the Orleans governor
proved to be a cardinal architect of Madison's designs on the
region to the Perdido. Madison and Claiborne decided upon a
course of action that would enlist the support of American-born
settlers in West Florida who would monitor events there, promote
pro-American sentiment, and quell any potential rebellion by
forces unfriendly to the United States. Central to the president's
plan was the key conspirator William Wykoff, a leading citizen of
the Baton Rouge area. As soon as the president and the governor
completed their grand design, the latter immediately issued
confidential instructions to Wykoff that elaborated more fully
upon the new West Florida policy. From all appearances, Claiborne
wrote, Bonaparte had taken Spain and thus, all hope for resistance
by the Junta was now lost and Ferdinand exiled. Although the
Louisiana Purchase gave the United States undisputed title to
West Florida, "it would be more pleasing that the taking possession
of the country, be preceded by a request from the inhabitants."
Claiborne then asked "can no means be devised to obtain such
request?" The people of West Florida, he continued, must adopt
measures which guaranteed their present and future security. The
collapse of the Spanish authority would most certainly instigate
intrigues and provoke competition throughout the region among
various factions tied to respective European powers. Silence the
factions, Claiborne ordered Wykoff, for the United States could
not tolerate instability so close to the southern border, and, most

8.

National lntelligencer, June 10, 1810. For assessments of the collapse of the
Spanish empire and its impact on the United States, see Charles C. Griffin,
The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1937); Arthur Whitaker, The United States and the
Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1941) ; and John Lynch, The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New
York: W. W. orton & Company, 1973). For the impact of these events on
Madison himself, see the editors' notes in the Madison Papers, 1: 305-20.
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WJLLlA)I C. C. CLAU301UlE.

William C.C. Claiborne, First Governor of the State of Louisiana (1812-1 816) . Image
courtesy of the West Florida Revolt Collection, the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies,
Southeastern Louisiana University.

importantly, "to form for themselves an independent government
is out of the question!" But the "line of conduct which honest
policy points out" could not be mistaken-"Nature has decreed
the union of Florida with the United States, and the welfare of the
inhabitants imperiously demands it." Wykoff was to sound the views
of the citizens of West Florida and "impress upon their minds the
importance of the crisis, the expedience of scouting everything
like French or English influence, and assure them, I pray you, of
the friendly disposition of the American government." Claiborne
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surmised that the "most eligible means of obtaining an expression
of the wish of the inhabitants of Florida" was through the voice
of the people themselves, and the "more satisfactory" manner of
-accomplishing this was "through the medium of a convention of
delegates, named by the people." Every part of West Florida should
be represented, moreover, and Wykoff should also "prepare for
the occasion the minds" of the leading citizens of Mobile. Secrecy,
of course, was paramount. In fact, Claiborne later admonished
Wykoff that "I hope my dear Sir, that you will always consider
the correspondence between us, during my stay at the City of
Washington, as confidential. There are persons who would gladly
learn the whole contents of my letters to you in order to use them
to my injury, and to that of the Government." 9
A week after Claiborne's missive, Secretary of State Smith also
sent instructions to Wykoff essentially detailing the same course of
action. A "crisis is at hand," Smith declared, which would produce
dramatic changes in the Spanish empire, possibly dissolving the
colony's relations with Spain. The geographical position of these
colonies to the United States "and other obvious considerations"
necessitated an "intimate interest" with the Western Hemisphere
and particularly the Floridas. It was, therefore, "our duty" to focus
attention on this "important subject." Besides local considerations,
the United States also "consider themselves as holding a legal title
to the greater part of West Florida under the purchase made by
the Convention with France in the year 1803." Thus, Wykoff was
selected for the "confidential purpose" of proceeding into West
and East Florida "for the purpose of diffusing the impression" ofU.
S. goodwill and common interest, and, in the case of its separation
from Spain, "their incorporation into our Union would coincide
with the sentiments and policy of the United States." Gather
intelligence, Smith instructed Wykoff, and keep the president
apprised regularly. It was "particularly proper to draw their
minds to a contemplation of the obvious and very disagreeable
consequence, as well as to them as to us, should the dissolution of
their ties to the parent Country be followed by a connection with
any of the European powers instead of the natural one suggested
by their geographical and maritime relations to the United States."

9_

Claiborne to Wykoff, june 14, 1810, in Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 35-37;
Claiborne to Wykoff, March 26, 1811, in Letter Books, 5: 189-90_
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With this, the Madison administration had embarked on a new,
and undeniably more covert, policy regarding West Florida. 10
Events in West Florida appeared to proceed as planned
_throughout the summer months of 1810. During the third week of
June, the citizens of the Feliciana District met in convention and
formed a common council comprising four districts armed with
the general powers of government. During the first week of July,
the citizens of the Baton Rouge district followed suit and held a
similar convention. Other districts in the West Florida area held
popular conventions and selected delegates to a larger convention
scheduled to convene later that month. On July 25, the St. Johns
Plains Convention commenced, a representative body of leading
citizens composed of fourteen members-thirteen of whom were
born in the United States, and only three of whom supported
continued Spanish authority. Madison must have been heartened
to learn that his agents assigned to the task of promoting the proAmerican position were succeeding. Of those fourteen members
elected on July 14 to attend the St. Johns Plains Convention, four
were American settlers who had been recommended to Wykoff
by Claiborne-William Barrow, Philip Hickey, Thomas Lilley, and
George Mather. The fact that the West Florida militia was largely
composed of former U. S. citizens only bolstered Madison's hopes
of enticing, through voluntary popular movement, a peaceful
request by the inhabitants of West Florida to join the American
Union to the north.
During these same months, correspondence regularly arrived
at the executive mansion informing the Madison administration of
these portentous events and providing a more detailed description
and analysis of the sentiments and perspectives of the citizens of
West Florida. One such informant was David Holmes, Governor of
the Mississippi Territory, and another U.S. official entrusted by the
10.

Smith to Wykoff, June 20, 1810, in Clarence Carter, ed., Territorial Papers of the
United Stales: Orleans Territory (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934-)
9: 883-84. On the very same day Smith instructed Wykoff, the secretary of
state also sent a missive to William H. Crawford requesting that the Georgian
appoint a confidential agent to go into East Florida and portions of West
Florida to encourage the population in these areas to agitate for admission
to the United States. Crawford, to the satisfaction of Madison, sought the
assistance of General George Mathews. For Mathews's activities, which resulted
in the infamous Patriot War of 1812, see the seminal study by James Cusick,
The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the American Invasion of Spanish East
Florida (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007).
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president. In mid:June, for example, Holmes discussed the political
situation in West Florida, and reported that Spanish authority
in the region was virtually nonexistent, even to the point that a
"sense of common danger" induced some inhabitants to form a
"kind of neighbourhood police" whose conduct was "inefficient"
and "unjust." The local population, in addition, tended to be
factionalized, as various parties leaned towards either the United
States or several European powers. The Mississippi governor also
wondered how the "state of Anarchy and confusion" south of the
border would affect adjacent U.S. territory, including the possibility
of slave uprisings. Holmes's rendition of events most · certainly
unnerved Madison, as the president recoiled at the thought of
anarchy, rebellion, or a weak and independent West Florida so close
to American territory and so susceptible to foreign influence or
filibusters. Subsequent intelligence provided by Holmes during the
first weeks of July, however, proved less threatening and revealed
that Madison's desire for West Floridians' popular public desire
to join the United States was still working. Holmes reported on
the popularly-elected conventions, which "by an almost unanimous
voice" adopted plans to respond to "both foreign invasion and
internal disturbances," and whose proceedings proved "incipient to
the more decisive and important Measure of asking the protection
of the United States." 11
Still, the content of Holmes's letters convinced Madison that
another step, and thus another key operative on the U. S. side of
the border, was now necessary to accomplish the administration's
West Florida policy. On July 17, the president, who had retreated
from the summer heat of Washington to Montpelier, decided that
an additional precaution must be taken, one which necessitated
the inclusion of Holmes more directly in the administration's
plans. "I think Govr. Holmes should be encouraged in keeping a
wakeful eye to occurrences & appearances in W. Florida, and in
transmitting information concerning them," the president notified
his secretary of state. "It will be well for him also to be attentive
to the means of having his Militia in a state for any service that
may be called for. In the event either of foreign interference with
W. F. or of internal convulsions, more especially if threatening the
neighboring tranquility, it will be proper to take care of the rights
& interests of the U.S. by every measure within the limits of the Ex.
11.

Holmes to Smith, June 20 and july 11, 1810, in Madison Papers, 2: 420, 458.
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Authority." Smith promptly informed Holmes of his new duties as
territorial governor of Mississippi, and apprised him of Claiborne's
instructions to Wykoff of the preceding month, directives that had
been sanctioned by the president of the United States. Potential
military intervention now accompanied the original objective of
pursing the voluntary invitation of the inhabitants of West Florida.
In the case that the latter goal failed, the former remedy would be
applied to achieve the ultimate end of securing U. S. control of
West Florida and for protecting national security.12
Holmes zealously accepted the mantle offered by Madison. A series
of letters from the Mississippi territorial governor quickly became the
main source of intelligence for the administration. In late july, Holmes
notified the president that the "occurrences now passing in West
Florida appear to me in a light so important to the Government of the
United States, that I cannot omit using all the means within my reach
to procure and transmit to you the best information relative thereto."
He then forwarded a critical piece of information provided by one
of the delegates to the St. Johns Plains Convention that, although a
"large mcyority" of the inhabitants of the region desired to enter the
Union, they feared military suppression from Spanish forces arriving
from Cuba before the United States could come to their aid. In early
August, the Mississippi governor sent the administration a copy of the
Convention's address to the Spanish governor and two resolutions
adopted by the body. "From the style and tenor of these Documents,"
Holmes reported, "we might be led to believe that nothing more was
desired than to redress Grievances, and to strengthen and support
the administration of the present Governor." But the facts proved
otherwise, according to Holmes. Unfortunately, "a correct Opinion
cannot be formed of the real Views and Wishes of either the Governor
or the Convention from their public and official Acts." One thing
was certain, however, and that was the fear of military intervention
on the part of Spanish authorities putting an end to the deliberations
of the Convention. Still, a large portion of the population sought
U. S. protection. In early September, Holmes followed up on his
earlier missives. He informed Madison that the Spanish governor
had conceded to the protestations and demands of the Convention,
and that the governor had been divested of most of his powers and
all powers placed "either under the immediate or direct control of
.-.

.-

12.

Madison to Smith,July 17, 1810, Smith to Holmes,July 21, 1820, in Madison
Papers, 2: 419, 420-21.
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the representatives of the people." More importantly, and thus more
critically for the objectives of the Madison administration, "It is not
contemplated by the representatives of any part of the community
who think upon the Subject that the province can maintain an
Independent Government, they of course will look to some power for
aid and protection." This last piece of intelligence could only have
proven as much disheartening as heartening for Madison. All reports
indicated that the citizens of West Florida overwhelmingly desired
U. S. protection and eventually entrance into the Union, but the
Madison administration would have to act quickly in order to prevent
foreign influence from disrupting U.S. objectives. West Florida could
not survive independently, but acting precipitately could prove as
dangerous for administration objectives as waiting too long to act. 13
Throughout the summer months of 1810, the Madison
administration received correspondence from other important
sources confirming the contents of Holmes's missives. John
Bedford, tax assessor for the 5L11 collection district of Tennessee,
received a steady dose of information from his friend William
Barrow, an American citizen who settled in West Florida in 1798
and who participated in the St. Johns Plains Convention. Bedford,
in turn, reported to Madison the contents of Barrow's letters.
In early July, conditions and sentiments in West Florida strongly
convinced Bedford that "a revolution of some kind may be
attempted in that country, before a great while," and that two plans
to secure this end were in the works-declare independence and
follow the lead of other Spanish American provinces and form a
new nation, or, declare independence and create a new nation with
the immediate objective of becoming "an integral part of the U.
States." Like Holmes, Bedford indicated that a "large majority" of
West Floridians desired to join the Union. Late in August, Bedford
enclosed to Madison another of Barrow's letters in which the latter
figure expressed a "frank expression of concern and solicitude and
unpleasant suspense about their political situation," a sentiment
shared by many other citizens of West Florida. Bedford, who knew
13.

Holmes to Smith,July 31 andAugust8, 1810, in Carter, TerritrrrialPapers, Orleans,
9: 889-90, 891-92; Holmes to Smith, September 12, 1810, in Carter, Territorial
Papers, Mississippi, 6 :115-18. The editors of the Madison Papers correctly claim
that Holmes 's correspondence to the Madison administration from June
through October of 1810 was "probably the single most important source of
information about the situation in West Florida thatJM was to receive, both
during his summer vacation and after his return to Washington on 6 October
1810." Madison Papers, 2:313-14.
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nothing of Madison's West Florida policy, replied to Barrow that
the inhabitants of the region no longer owed any allegiance to
Spain, that they should "assume the rights of self-government,"
that their interests were those of the United States and thus Florida
"ought & must in time" become part of the Union, and that to
"secure & facilitate" this end they should "constitute a separate
& independent government" in West Florida which could be
maintained until it was "proper & consistent" with U. S. policy to
"protect or incorporate them" into the United States. Such counsel
undoubtedly meshed with that being disseminated by Wykoff and
others friendly to the cause of the Madison administration. 14
The territorial secretary of Orleans, Thomas B. Robertson,
also became an integral figure in the administration's evolving
West Florida policy. Just days before he informed Holmes of his
new role in the grand design to secure the region, Secretary of
State Smith also instructed Robertson to monitor events and
sentiments in West Florida and to report back the "most regular
and precise information." The Madison administration informed
the territorial secretary that the United States welcomed an
insurrection in West Florida to be conducted and led by former
American citizens residing there, and mentioned the instructions
to Wykoff and Holmes to encourage such an event, including the
use of the Mississippi territorial militia to occupy the area in order
to stimulate further rebellion among the inhabitants. Robertson
proved a faithful servant during the remaining summer months
of 1810. He notified the administration that the people of West
Florida "appear to be preparing to throw off their dependence on
Spain," and that news of Venezuela's actions had just arrived "to
hasten the event." Robertson also discussed the various political
allegiances of the population and forwarded the addresses of the
St. Johns Plains Convention. In sum, the Madison administration
received throughout the summer of 1810 ample and consistent
intelligence about the events unfolding and the sentiments of the
residents of West Florida. 15

14.
15.

Barrow to Bedford, June 4, 1810, Bedford to Madison, July 4, 26 August 1810,
in Madison Papers, 2: 399-400, 508-09.
Smith to Robertson, July 13, 1810, Graham to Robertson, July 30, 1810, in
Waciuma, Intervention, 145; Robertson to Smith,July 6, July 28, 1810, Madison
Papers, 2:458, 505-06; Robertson to Smith, August 26, 1810, in Carter, Territorial
Papers, Orleans, 9: 896-97.
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Not everything went so smoothly for the Madison
administration during that summer. The president's capable and
trusted agents were certainly in place and successfully carrying
out their assigned tasks, but a number of serious complications
threatened to undermine Madison's West Florida policy. For one,
rowdy American settlers in the Tombigbee region threatened a
filibuster against Mobile. Such a scenario undermined Madison's
objective of securing the voluntary request of the inhabitants of
West Florida. The president, therefore, took every precaution in
order to prevent American invasion of Spanish territory and the
disruption of his peaceful annexation of the region to the Perdido
River. First, Madison secured the direct assistance and intervention
of Mississippi Territory officials, primarily that of Territorial Judge
Harry Toulmin, who consistently and successfully thwarted the
militaristic intrigues of the American citizens-the Caller, Kennedy,
and Kemper clans-instigating an "unlawful expedition" ultimately
producing "injurious consequences" for U. S. policy. Second, the
president reinforced the U. S. garrison at Fort Stoddert, situated
just north of Mobile, and he even considered invoking the 1794
Logan Act to squash any movements made by Americans against
Mobile. "There can be no doubt of its unlawfulness," Madison
informed Toulmin, "nor as to the duty of the Executive to employ
force if necessary to arrest it, and to make examples of the Authors."
Fortunately for the Madison administration, the proposed filibuster
never materialized. 16
Another complication, however, directly concerned executive
authority. The president believed he had the constitutional power
to employ force against American citizens threatening foreignoccupied soil, but questions arose immediately about presidential
power to annex or occupy foreign-occupied soil, even in the event of a
peaceful request to do so by the inhabitants thereof. As the situation
within West Florida seemed to proceed according to plan during
tl1e late summer of 1810, Madison asked his cabinet to weigh in
on this most crucial subject. "Should it become necessary," he
16.

Madison to Eustis, August 10 and September 7, 1810, Eustis to Madison,
August 19 and September 14, 1810, Richard Sparks to Eustis, July 12, 1820,
Madison to Graham, August 10 and 24, 1810, Madison to Gallatin , August
22 , 1810, Graham to Madison, August 29 and September 3, 1810, Madison to
Toulmin, September 5, 1810, Madison Papers, 2: 466, 473, 474, 497, 501-02, 50405, 515-16, 522, 525, 529-30, 543; Toulmin to Madison , July 28, 1810, Homes
to Smith, September 12, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, M ississippi, 6: 84-90,
117.
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stated to Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, "for the Ex. to
exercise authority within those limits, before the meeting of Congs.
I forsee many legal difficulties." "Will you tum your thoughts to the
question," Madison concomitantly requested of Secretary of War
William Eustis, "what steps are within the Executive Competency, in
case the deliberations of the people of W. Florida should issue in
an offer to place the territory under the Authority of the U. S.?"
Both responded in the affirmative, that the president possessed the
constitutional authority to occupy West Florida. Gallatin maintained
that the "law which authorizes the President to take possession of
Louisiana will legally cover any other measures which policy may
dictate in relation to that part of West Florida which lies between the
Mississippi & the Perdido," but "what ground ought generally to be
taken consistent with justice, the rights and interests of the U. States,
and the preservation of peace is the difficult question." Eustis fully
concurred. "But as it is impossible to [divine] what course they might
take," he counseled the president, "it is equally difficult to determine
what part should be taken by [the] Government." Should the
deliberations of the citizens of West Florida result in a formal reg uest
to place the region under U. S. authority on terms deemed by the
latter to be admissible and justifiable, "protection of some kind will
[necessarily be implied]-protection under such circumstances
[implies force; how far], how near and to what extent must depend
on [events and] may not probably require to be determined before
the [next month]." As for the president's worries over the status of
the customs house in the event of an invitation to occupy the region,
Gallatin invoked the fourth and eleventh sections of the 1804 Mobile
Act, which the "laws having been so worded as to include the districts
of Orleans & Mobile whatever we may claim & possess," and which
provided for either annexation to the Mississippi Territory's revenue
district "all the navigable rivers ... lying within the United States,
which empty into the Gulf of Mexico, east of the river Mississippi"
or the creation of a separate revenue district for waters of "the bay
and river Mobile ... emptying into the Gulf of Mexico, east of the
said river Mobile." Such advice quickly convinced the president
that he indeed retained all the necessary authority to act on any
request emanating from West Florida. He mentioned to Jefferson
that West Florida presented "serious questions" as to the authority
of the executive, as well as to the "adequacy of the existing laws of
the U. S. for territorial administration," and the "near approach of
Congs. might subject any intermediate interposition of the Ex. to the
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charge of being premature & disrespectful, if not of being illegal."
Still, "there is great weight in the considerations, that the country
to the Perdido, being our own, may be farily, taken possession of, if
_it can be done ·without violence, above all if there be danger of its
passing into the hands of a third & dangerous party." 17
The threat of that "third & Dangerous" party offered a third-and
the most serious complication-an intense American Anglophobia.
Most Americans, Madison included, ardently believed that the British
bogeyman threatened to seize the initiative and add West Florida to
the British empire. Of course, American fears of British intervention
in or even occupation of West Florida was nothing new. Madison,
in fact, encountered this prospect from the very beginning of his
presidency. Wilkinson, for example, had suggested to Madison in April
of 1809 that if the United States "have not peace with Great Britain,"
then the "whole force destined to this quarter, should be pressed
forward, because she can, at her will, take possession of West Florida."
Claiborne, too, worried about the British specter during those early
days of the Madison administration. Despite Folch's assurances, made
during their visit that same month in 1809, that the Spanish colonies
would not fall into the hands of England, Claiborne still declared
to Secretary of State Smith that "it is greatly to be desired, that the
[Spanish colonies] may not fall either commercially or politically into
the hands of Great Britain or France, and without a severe struggle,
one or the other event, seems to me inevitable." The interests of
the United States, continued Claiborne, required that all European
influence in the Americas, and England's most of all, "should be
banished [from] the continent of America." 18
Madison most certainly shared these fears. At the same time
that the U. S. secretary of state informed Wykoff of his confidential
mission in West Florida, Smith also notified the U. S. minister to
Great Britain, William Pinkney, that the Madison administration
would not tolerate British interference in that region. The imminent
17.

18.

Madison to Gallatin, August 22, 1810, Madison to Eustis, August 30, 1810,
Gallatin to Madison, September 5, 1810, Eustis to Madison, September 7,
1810, Madison Papers, 2: 501-02, 516-17, 527, 531; U. S. Statutes at Large, 2: 25154; Madison to Jefferson, October 19, 1810, in J. Jefferson Looney, ed., The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004-), 3: 177, hereinafter cited as Jefferson Papers. Madison also notified
William Pinkney that the "occupancy of the Territory as far as the Perdido, was
called for by the crisis there, and is understood to be within the authy. of the
Executive." Madison to Pinkney, October 30, 1810, Madison Papers, 2: 605 .
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disruption of the Spanish empire, Smith instructed Pinkney, made
it the duty of the United States to turn its attention to the Floridas,
"in whose destiny they have so near an interest." Besides the obvious
geographical situation, the U . S. government claimed a legal title
to "the greater portion of West Florida" based on the Louisiana
Purchase. Under these circumstances, Smith concluded, "it may
be proper not to conceal from the British Government (which may
otherwise form views towards these territories inconsistent with the
eventual ones entertained by the United States) that any steps on
the part of Great Britain interfering with these will necessarily be
regarded as unjust and unfriendly, and as leading to collisions."
Here, then, from the confines of the Madison administration,
came the germination of the No Transfer policy. 19
Fears of English intervention in West Florida also filled the 1810
summer correspondence to the Madison administration, as every
one of the president's agents broached the issue in nearly every
letter. Robertson, for example, informed the administration that if
the Spanish authorities refused to accede to the demands made by
the citizens ofWest Florida, then the refusal "might be attended with
serious consequences" as the "English who held most of the offices
in the province were the chief obstacle to their adopting measures
leading to independence" and that "unless the United States showed
some disposition to countenance them a messenger would be sent to
England to propose an alliance with that Govt." Holmes confirmed
the fears of his compatriots. He notified the administration that West
Florida could not maintain its independence and would thus "look
to some power for aid and protection." Either the United States
or Great Britain would be the obvious choice. "The friends to a
connexion with Great Britain are numerous, intelligent, and active,"
Holmes warned Madison, and "their endeavors to gain proselytes are
unremitting and the arguments brought forward in support of their
Opinions are of an impressive and operative Nature. The ability of
Great Britain to afford the best Markets for the productions of the
province and to promote in other respects the pecuniary Interests
of the Inhabitants are Urged as powerful inducements for forming a
connexion with that nation." These recurring admonitions certainly
did not fall on deaf ears back in Washington. 20
19. Smith to Pinkney,June 13, 1810, in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1: 5-6.
20. Robertson to Smith, August 26, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, Orleans, 9:
896-97; Holmes to Smith, September 12, 1810, in Carter, Territorial papers,
Mississippi, 6: 115-18.
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This same Anglophobia pervaded Madison 's administration.
At the same time that Holmes's and Robertson's correspondence
reached the nation's capital in the late summer of 1810, Gallatin
opined to President Madison, still at Montpelier, that "every
circumstance" corroborated his opinion that England will attempt
to govern the Spanish colonies through the medium of a nominal
Spanish regency, and that she will oppose the Spanish American
revolutionary movements by keeping up a war in some corner of
Spain. Gallatin also feared that England would take possession
of Cuba, and thus "English interest and prejudices against us"
arising from there would be the "principal obstacles" to American
interests in that region. "We may expect new sources of collision,"
the Treasury Secretary concluded. "Florida & Cuba are by the far
most important objects & will require some immediate decision."
The U. S. Charge de Affaires to Spain, George Erving, another
of the administration's trusted advisors, presented Madison the
sternest warning regarding British machinations concerning the
status of the Floridas. "It appears to me that G. B. is now playing
a deep speculating game with the poor Spaniards," he wrote the
president, and "taking it for granted that the English government
cannot overlook the Floridas, but that on the contrary for many
principal reasons, they will be disposed to make their first location
there, it occurs to me that the U.S. should anticipate any movement
of that sort, or any communication on the part of England of a
guarantee &c-by a formal & bold declaration that in a certain
state of things they will take possession of the Floridas"- or, in
sum, that the United States "will never suffer them to be held by a
European power other than that to which they now owe allegiance."
Erving presented, therefore, the first explicit appeal for what was
to become the No Transfer Resolution of 1811, and, arguably,
revealed the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823-and it all
started with U.S. concerns over the future of West Florida and the
threat of British intervention therein. 21
Matters changed abruptly for the Madison administration
in October of 1810, however, as a series of rapidly developing
events finally compelled the president to take action. The
first development concerned, as could be expected, American
Anglophobia. On October 14, the administration received
21.

Erving to Madison, September 2 and October 20, 1810, Gallatin to Madison,
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information that the Caracas Junta, which had earlier that year
declared its independence from Spain, had now granted to Great
Britain a series of lucrative commercial concessions. The following
day, the National Intelligencer published an official proclamation
Irom the government of Venezuela, in which the new nation not
only sought commercial relations with England, but also requested
"protection from G. B." On October 17, the editor of the newspaper,
Joseph Gales, called on Madison, now back in Washington, and
listened as the president bemoaned British meddling in South
America, which quickly turned to worries about British influence
in West Florida. Cabinet officials shared Madison's consternation.
Two days later, Madison confided to his friend Thomas Jefferson
that "the Crisis in W. Florida as you will see has come home to our
feelings and our interests." The "successful party at Baton Rouge,"
the president continued, "have not yet made any communication
or invitation to this Govt. They certainly will call in, either our Aid
or that of G. B. whose conduct at the Caraccas gives notice of her
propensity to fish in troubled waters. From present appearances,
our occupancy of W. F. would be resented by Spain, by England,
& by France, and bring on, not a triangular, but quadrangular
contest." But fears of English intrigues and potential international
conflict were not yet enough to compel Madison to seize the
initiative. As he intimated to Jefferson, the president still needed
the invitation of the inhabitants thereof-and they would certainly
not let him down. 22
Mter intercepting a communique from the Spanish governor
at Baton Rouge to Governor Folch in Pensacola requesting military
assistance, the president and delegates involved with the St. Johns
Plains Convention ordered the local militia commander, Philemon
Thomas, to seize the Spanish fort at Baton Rouge. Thomas,
with a small contingent of former American citizens, responded
accordingly, and on September 23, 1810, captured the fort. Three
days later, ten of the Convention members convened and declared
West Florida independent of Spain. That very same day, John Rhea,
president of the Convention, sent a copy of the declaration to
Holmes, further requesting that the Mississippi territorial governor
forward the document to President Madison. Almost two weeks
22.

Nationallntelligencer, October 15, 1810; Smith to Armstrong, November 1,1810,
in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1: 7-8; Madison to jefferson, October 19,
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later, on October 10, the Republic of West Florida formally asked
the U. S. government for "that immediate protection to which we
consider ourselves entitled." Finally, the Madison administration
had its invitation to take what it already had claimed. 23
As soon as Holmes received the much-awaited news from
south of the border, he sent it to Washington. In the meantime,
the Mississippi governor had yet to receive his orders, issued earlier
by the secretary of state, to occupy West Florida in the event of
independence and a request for protection. Holmes, however,
seized the initiative, and, "thoroughly impressed with the necessity
of taking immediate measures for the safety of the persons and
property of the Citizens of this territory who reside near the line of
demarcation," immediately ordered to the border two companies
of U. S. troops stationed near the territorial capital. The news of
the sudden events consuming West Florida most likely alarmed
Madison when it arrived at the nation's capital. For one, the
revelation that Holmes had not received his orders to enter and
occupy the region until September 29 could delay U.S. occupation,
ultimately undermining the ability of American forces to protect
the people of West Florida. Worse yet, Holmes also reported that
a significant number of the inhabitants, namely from the Mobile
district, were "inimical to the New order of things" and, bolstered
with Spanish troops from Pensacola, were quite likely to strike
back at the Convention. Rumors also circulated that pro-Spanish
forces in West Florida were actively seeking the support of local
Indians, and that "an insurrection of Slaves, who are very numerous
in the upper part of the Province," was very likely. Holmes's
correspondence during the first several weeks of the fall of 1810,
combined with a rabid Anglophobia, spurred Madison to action. 24
"News arrived today, that West Florida is declared independent,
by Convention," Joseph Gales noted in his journal entry of October
25, and "official information received same day." President Madison
23.

24.

For the various correspondence regarding the West Florida declaration of
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immediately convened a three-hour, closed session of his cabinet,
Gales recalled. Two days later, President Madison issued his famous
October Proclamation, the first statement on what soon was to
become the No Transfer Resolution of 1811. The president declared
that a "Crisis has at length arrived" in West Florida, subverting
Spanish authority there, threatening the "tranquility and security of
our adjoining territories," and giving "new facilities" for the violation
of "our revenue and commercial laws and of those prohibiting
the introduction of slaves." Due to these "peculiar and imperative
circumstances," any hesitation or forbearance on the part of the
Unites States to occupy West Florida and thus prevent "confusions
and contingencies" undermining national security, would be seen
as nothing less than a "dereliction of their title" or an "insensibility
to the importance of the stake." In the meantime, aU. S.-occupied
West Florida would still be a "subject of fair and friendly negotiation
and adjustment." Madison also referred to the American claim to
the territory between the Mississippi and the Perdido rivers pursuant
to the Louisiana Purchase, and that the United States had merely
acquiesced in the "temporary continuance" of Spanish authority
in that particular region out of "their conciliatory views and by
a confidence in the justice of their cause and in the success of
candid discussion and amicable negotiation with a just and friendly
power," and not out of any "distrust of their title" to the region.
The "satisfactory adjustment" of the American claim had been "too
long delayed" and "entirely suspended" by events over which the
United States had no control. Existing acts of congress, in addition,
had already contemplated "an eventual possession" of West Florida
and were "accordingly so framed as in that case to extend in their
operation" to that region. The president, therefore, "in pursuance
of these weighty and urgent considerations" deemed it "right and
requisite" that the United States should take possession of the
territory and add it to the Orleans Territory. Madison then directed
Governor Claiborne to extend his authority over the area. "This
act of occupancy, which is merely a change of possession and not
a change of right," Secretary of State Smith summed it up to John
Armstrong, Madison 's U.S. minister to France, "will it is hoped, be
viewed only as the natural consequence of a state of things, which
the American Government could neither foresee nor prevent." 25
25. Joseph Gales, "Recollections of the Civil History of the War of 1812,"
Historical Magazine, 3rd series, 3 (March 1874), 158; Madison to the House
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The same day that the president signed his proclamation, he
ordered Governor Claiborne to proceed at once to Natchez, publish
and circulate the Proclamation in English, French, and Spanish, enlist
the protection and assistance of U. S. regulars stationed along the
southwestern fran tier, and enter in to and take possession ofWest Florida.
Once accomplished, Claiborne was to extend the laws of the Orleans
Territory, organize the militia, establish parish courts, and, "finally, to
do whatever your legal powers applicable to the case will warrant, and
may be calculated to maintain order; to secure to the inhabitants the
peaceable enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion; and to
place them, as far as may be, on the same footing with the inhabitants
of the other districts under your authority." The territorial legislature
of Orleans would provide any additional and necessary authority or
provisions. If, "contrary to expectation," U.S. occupation was met with
or opposed by force, the commanding officer of the U.S. regulars would
assist the governor, and, if deemed necessary, so would the militia of
the territories of Orleans and Mississippi. At the same time, should any
particular place in the newly acquired territory remain in the possession
of Spanish forces, no force was to be employed against them. The very
next day, October 28, Claiborne set out from Washington bound to
the Mississippi territory and thence on to Baton Rouge to carry out his
instructions. In the meantime, the administration apprised Holmes of
Claiborne's sundry duties and instructed the Mississippi governor to
coordinate and provide any necessary support. 26
Madison's October Proclamation in no way resolved who
controlled West Florida. American officials secured only the western
portions, including the Baton Rouge area; events in the eastern part,
the Mobile area, still proved chaotic. During the month of October,
for example, rumors circulated widely throughout the eastern portion
of a Convention army making its way from the western region, causing
the "utmost panic" and fomenting "a crisis to be fast approaching." The
Baton Rouge men indeed presented those from Mobile a "temperate

26.
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& friendly" disposition to join the cause, but they also hinted that
force may be their only recourse. Wedded to this concern was
American interest in the future of the remaining portion of Spanish
West Florida, from Pensacola to the Apalachicola River, and to all of
East Florida, to which the United States had no legitimate claims. "E
Florida is of great importance to the U.S. and it is not probable that
Congs. will let it pass into any new hands," Madison wrote Pinkney at
the end of October. "It is to be hoped G. B. will not entangle herself
with us, by seizing it, either with or without the privity of her Allies
in Cadiz." The position of Cuba, too, gave the U.S. government "so
deep an interest in her destiny," and although the island "might be an
inactive" it "could not be a satisfied spectator, at its falling under any
European Govt. which might make a fulcn1m of that position agst. the
commerce or security of the U.S." Making matters worse, concluded
the president, with respect to Spanish America generally, Great
Britain "is engaged in the most eager, and if without the concurrence
of the Spanish [authority] at Cadiz, the most reproachful grasp of
political influence and commercial preferences." Deep concerns over
U. S. national security still kept the Florida question uppermost in
the minds of the Madison administration, despite U. S. occupation
of Baton Rouge. More must be done, they realized. But unilateral
presidential action would not remedy the situation, and the president
revealed another serious concern on the part of the administrationthe need for congressional assent to the October Proclamation, which
the administration had yet to reveal to congress. To such dire subjects,
the Madison administration turned its full attention in December of
1810. The logical end of the administration's efforts was the historic
No Transfer Resolution of the following month. 27
In his second annual message, President Madison finally notified
congress of the October Proclamation. It was December 5 and Governor
Claiborne was already on the scene in West Florida. Due to ongoing
disruptions within the Spanish empire, the administration necessarily
focused on "that portion of West Florida which, though of right
appertaining to the United States, had remained in the possession of
Spain awaiting the result of negotiations for its actual delivery to them." In
the meantime, however, Spanish authority had been subverted, exposing
that nation to "ulterior events" ultimately threatening U. S. "rights and
Welfare." The president, therefore, had to occupy the territory "to which
27.

Madison to Pinkney, October 30, 1810, Toulmin to Madison, October 31 , 1810,
Madison Papers, 2: 605, 606-08 .
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the title of the United States extends, and to which the laws provided for
the Territory of Orleans are applicable." The "legality and necessity of the
course pursued" by Madison assured him that congress would approve his
action in the most "favorable light," and, thus, that body would provide
any necessary legislation further protecting the "rights and equitable
interests of the people thus brought into the bosom of the American
family." West Florida's declaration of independence and the subsequent
request for U. S. protection accompanied the message to congress, along
with a copy of the October Proclamation. 28
Congress heeded Madison's call and commenced debate over the
future of West Florida that very month. The bill "declaring the laws
now in force in the Territory of Orleans to extend to, and to have full
force and effect, to the river Perdido, pursuant to the treaty concluded
at Paris on.the 30rh of April, 1803" generated a number of challenging,
and to some extent, irresolvable, questions, and produced equally
cogent arguments both for and against Madison's request for U. S.
annexation of the region. First, did the United States have "good
title" to the territory under question? Second, did Spanish perfidy
and spoliation claims provide justification for seizure? Third, did
national security and the "law of self-preservation," that is, the threat
of a foreign power seizing West Florida, necessitate U.S. occupation?
Fourth, did Madison's Proclamation transcend executive authority
and, thus, prove unconstitutional, namely as it concerned issues of
legislation and war? Congressional answers to these dicey questions
remained unanswered as 1810 turned into 1811. 29
28. James Madison, Second Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1810, in
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 1: 484.
29. For the congressional debate over the West Florida bill, see Annals of Congress,
11 th Cong., 3rd sess., 37-66. For the full text of the bill, see Annals of Congress, 11th
Cong., 3rd sess., 25-26. The Federalist Senator from Delaware, Outerbridge
Horsey, went so far as to suggest that the Madison administration's policy of
economic coercion as retaliation against England 's commercial restrictions
violating U. S. neutral rights and damaging American commerce were
directly connected with the administration's actions in West Florida: "Let it
be remembered that Great Britain is now the ally of Spain, and, for aught
we know, may have guarantied her colonies. Would it not at least have been
prudent ... to have inquired what part she would take? If she is to act the
part of an ally, offensive and defensive, or of an ally at all, can it be expected
that she will revoke her Orders in Council, or even remain indifferent? It is
a singular circumstance, that the proclamation reviving the non-intercourse
with Great Britain and the one for taking possession of Florida were upon the
anvil at the same time. There is only five days difference in their dates, and the
Florida proclamation is the first. Sir, to me, they look a good deal like twin
brothers." Annals of Congress, IF" Cong., 3rd sess., 55.
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Madison's October Proclamation also directly affected
another spirited debate consuming congress at the same time as
the consideration of the West Florida bill-a bill for admitting
the Territory of Orleans to the Union. A number of congressmen
noted that the president's occupation of West Florida and the
immediate addition of the area to the Orleans Territory conflicted
with that portion of the proclamation calling for a "fair and
friendly negotiation and adjustment. " If Orleans became a state,
with West Florida as part of its domain, queried one congressman,
then "would not all right of negotiation on the subject be taken
from the President?" Another asked could the executive "convey
away any part of a State?" "What power have we to negotiate
about the territory of any of the States?" pondered several
others. Madison 's proclamation indeed carried with it a number
of important considerations of constitutional law, aspects not
readily perceived by the president in the fall of 1810. Despite such
reservations, congress voted in mid:January of 1811 to admit the
Territory of Orleans into the Union as the State of Louisiana. But
other than allowing Louisiana-West Florida included-a spot
on the Stars and Stripes, congress had yet to act on the Florida
question. Executive action during the first two weeks of january of
1811, however, quickly returned Washington's attention to events
unfolding immediately south of the American border. Once again
the Madison administration had taken the offensive. 30
Several documents simultaneously landed in the president's
hands in late December of 1810. The first set was rather
propitious; the second set proved considerably more ominous.
All of it convinced the administration that the Florida question
was far from settled. Together, the correspondence Madison sent
congress on January 3, 1811, prompted that body to address the
administration's concerns over the future of the Floridas and the
potential consequences concerning U. S. interests. As to the first
of the correspondence, Folch voluntarily offered Madison the
remainder of West Florida. The Spanish governor had hinted over
the previous years that he would do so, but now he made it official.
Unless succor arrived from Spanish authorities in Mexico or Cuba,
or unless the Spanish authorities had already opened negotiations
directly with the United States, Folch "decided on delivering this
province to the United States under an equitable capitulation."
30.

Annals oJCongress, 11 th Cong. , 3rd sess. , 482-83, 484, 496, 497, 519.
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"The incomprehensible abandonment in which I see myself, and
the afflicted situation to which this province sees itself reduced,
not only authorize me, but force me to have recourse to this
9etermination, the only one to save it from the ruin which threatens
it," he informed the Madison administration. "The United States
are also authorized to accept it; for as the disturbances which now
afflict this province, so near to them, must increase every day, they
cannot but have an influence on their tranquility, an object which
merits the first care of every Government." Madison could not have
stated it any better. 31
The other correspondence reaching Madison, however,
attracted more of the president's attention and obvious concernthe British government protested the U. S. occupation of West
Florida. In addition, the British considered the American claim
to the region as "manifestly doubtful," and even chastised the
lVIadison administration for using the West Florida rebellion as
"the pretext for wresting a province from a friendly Power, and
that in the time of her adversity." As a close ally of Spain, the British
government "cannot see with indifference any attack upon her
interests in America," and the "Mistress of the Seas" requested an
explanation from the president that "will at once" convince the
British government of the "pacific disposition" of the United States
towards its Spanish friend, and thusly to remove the "contrary
impression" that Madison 's annual message made upon the British
government. Relations with Great Britain were already considerably
strained, and such a response from His Majesty's minister in
Washington only irritated an already infectious Anglophobia. 32
Indeed, in Madison's special message to congress addressing
the correspondence of both Folch and Morier, the president
dwelled entirely on the British missive, not the Spanish one.
Although Madison believed that the British minister acted without
any formal instructions from his superiors, and although the
British government had never officially communicated to the
United States any agreement with Spain that required any British
interposition materially affecting the United States, and although
Spain had made no call for the fulfillment of any supposed
existing agreement, "the spirit and scope of the document, with
the accredited source from which it proceeds," demanded the
31. Folch to Smith, Folch to McKee, December 2, 1810, ASP: FR, 3: 398, 399.
32. John P. Marier to Smith, December 15, 1810, ASP: FR, 3: 399, 400.
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consideration of congress. President Madison then provided
the first explicit statement of the policy that would become the
famous No Transfer Resolution. "Taking into view the tenor of
these several communications, the posture of things with which
they are connected, the intimate relation of the country adjoining
the United States eastward of the river Perdido to their security
and tranquility, and the peculiar interest they otherwise have
in its destiny," the president recommended to congress "the
seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not
see without serious inquietude any part of a neighboring territory
in which they have in different respects so deep and so just a
concern pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other
foreign power." Madison also recommended that congress consider
the "expediency of authorizing the Executive to take temporary
possession of any part or parts of the said Territory, in pursuance
of arrangements which may be desired by the Spanish authorities,
and for making provision for the government of the same during
such possession," and, more importantly, "to provide for the event
of a subversion of the Spanish authorities within the Territory in
question, and an apprehended occupancy thereof by any other
foreign power." One of the most important and consequential
documents of American foreign policy, therefore, originated
with the Madison administration, and, although directed at areas
of Florida not currently under American control, this policy was
conceived, developed, and matured as a direct result of the events
unfolding in West Florida during the summer of 1810. 33
No sooner had Madison made his appeal to congress,
then the British bogeymen quickly materialized in another, yet
equally, menacing manifestation. Exactly a week after sending to
congress the Spanish governor's propitious request and the British
minister's ominous one, Madison disclosed another startling
piece of intelligence, one that merely fueled an already fervent
Anglophobia consuming the administration and its supporters
in congress. The revolutionary government of Venezuela had
intercepted a letter written by Luis de Onis, the Spanish minister
representing the Cadiz government in America, bound for the
Captain General of Caracas. In a fit of vituperation unbecoming
a diplomatic official of his station, Onis insinuated that military
33.

Madison to Congress, January 3, 1811, in Richardson, Messages and Papers, 1:
488.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol90/iss2/5

28

Belko: The Origins of the Monroe Doctrine Revisited: The Madison Adminis
ORIGINS OF THE

No

TRANSFER POLICY

185

force may be a viable option to neutralize U. S. influence in the
Western hemisphere. The Spanish minister angrily declared, albeit
in rather sarcastic and dismissive tones, that "if England should
display her energy, in however small a degree, and if, on our part,
some vessels should be sent to their coasts, and some troops should
draw near to Louisiana, there is reason to believe that we should see
these provinces separated and divided into two or three republics,
and, consequently, they would remain in a state of perfect nullity."
The letter passed into the hands of an American agent, who then
promptly sent it straight to President Madison. Such a threatening
charge coming from such a high-ranking source only justified in
the minds of the administration that Florida was indeed a serious
security concern, and, ultimately, confirmed their fears that a
foreign power-England namely-could and most likely would
acquire the territory. 34
But the administration had prodded enough. Congress finally
responded, and quickly. Less than a week after the Madison
administration notified congress of Onfs's imprudent missive,
and undoubtedly as concerned as the president about national
security along the southern border with Florida and as fueled by
fears of English intrigues in that region, congress enacted the No
Transfer Resolution. Much of the wording was Madison's: "Taking
into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American
provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the
territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may
have upon their security, tranquility, and commerce," congress
resolved that the nation, "under the peculiar circumstances of the
existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of
the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power" and
that a "due regard to their own safety compels them to provide,
under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the
said territory," an occupation which shall "remain subject to future
negotiation." As the Madison administration requested, congress
authorized the executive "to take possession of, and occupy, all or
any part of the territory lying east of the river Perdido, and south
of the state of Georgia and the Mississippi territory," in the event
that "an arrangement has been, or shall be, made with the local
authority of the said territory, for delivering up the possession of
34.

Onfs to Captain General of the Province of Caracas, 2 February 1810, ASP: FR,
3:404.
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the same, or any part thereof, to the United States," or in the more
menacing event "of an attempt to occupy the said territory, or any
part thereof, by any foreign government." In either case, congress
empowered the president to employ the armed forces as deemed
necessary to secure these ends, appropriated a hefty sum of money
to cover the expense, and provided that a "temporary government"
be established under U. S. occupation. 35
Six weeks later, congress ordered, through a supplementary
piece of legislation, that the No Transfer Resolution would not be
printed or published until the end of the next session of congress,
or unless directed by the president to do otherwise. In other words,
the act was to remain a secret for the time being. Not until February
of 1812, as war with Great Britain loomed just over the horizon,
did congress authorize the president "to occupy and hold all that
tract of country called West Florida, which lies west of the river
Perdido, not now in possession of the United States." The Madison
administration would not achieve this objective until U. S. forces
seized Mobile from Spain in 1813, as war raged with England. 36
The Madison administration wasted no time in promulgating
the new American policy to the world. Exactly a week after congress
confirmed Madison's West Florida policy and redirected it eastward
and hence southward, the president informed the U. S. minister to
England of the No Transfer Resolution that had "passed with closed
doors." ''You will thence perceive that the United States are not
disposed to acquiesce in the occupation on the part of any foreign
power of any part of East or West Florida, and that Congress have
provided under certain contingencies for the temporary occupation
of the said Territory," Smith apprised Pinkney. "This proceeding is, on
the part of the United States justified by national interest and national
policy; an interest founded upon a recognized though unliquidated
claim on Spain for indemnities; and a policy imperatively prescribed
by a legitimate principle of self preservation." The secretary of state
then reviewed the history of U. S. interest in acquiring Spanish
Florida, from the negotiations prior to the Louisiana Purchase for its
"peaceable acquisition," to the diminished "geographical extent of
West Florida" as result of the 1803 treaty with France, and, finally, to
the "increased solicitude of the United States for the Sovereignty of
a tract of Country, whose contiguity rendered it vitally important in a
35.
36.

U. S. Statutes at Large, 3: 471-72.

Ibid., 3: 472.
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military, naval and commercial point of view." Now mingled with these
considerations were claims by the United States against Spain, "the
final adjustment of which, it was believed, might be facilitated by a
-purchase for a fair price, of all the Territory of Florida east of the River
Perdido." The conquest of Spain and the consequent revolutions
convulsing the Spanish empire in America, however, intervened, and
thus made it "more natural" and "more conformable to justice" that the
United States "seek security" for the indemnities Spain owed America
and which payment had been so long delayed. A newly-established
government in Spain, moreover, which may absolve itself from its debts,
demanded that the United States make a "pledge in possession" for the
remuneration of"so many losses" experienced by American citizens at
the hands of Spain. Of course the Madison administration disavowed
any wanton extension of territory, and promised that the "future
peace and safety" of the nation upon "honorable and reasonable
terms" dictated American policy. "The United States cannot see with
indifference a foreign power, under any pretext whatever possess
itself of the Floridas," Smith concluded to Pinkney. "The prospect of
danger to the Union from such a step would be too imminent, the real
object too apparent for them either to disguise their sentiments or to
hesitate a moment as to the conduct which they would be inevitably
compelled to pursue." This "explicit declaration," moreover, ought to
admonish the British from any inclination "of gaining a footing in the
Floridas." Throughout the spring and summer months of 1811, other
American diplomats transmitted to European courts the very same
line of reasoning devised by the Madison administration in 1810 and
confirmed by congress in 1811. 37
Although the Madison administration applied the No Transfer
Resolution to East Florida and the remaining Spanish portion of
West Florida from the Perdido to the Apalachicola rivers, the policy
originated in the events unfolding in West Florida during the
summer and fall of 1810. Of course the justification for occupying
the region east of the Perdido River differed somewhat from that
which justified U. S. occupation of the region west of the Perdido.
The Madison administration emphasized a legal American
claim to the territory from Baton Rouge to Mobile, based on the
Louisiana Purchase, as the basis for the October Proclamation and
37.

Smith to Pinkney, January 22, 1811 , in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1:
9-11. See also Monroe to Foster,July 8 and November 2, 1811 , ASP: FR., 3: 543,
544-45, and Jonathan Russell to Duke of Bassano, April 30, 1811 , in Waciuma,
Intervention, 191-9 3.
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subsequent occupation. But no such claim applied to the rest of
Spanish Florida. Eventually, Madison stressed claims owed by Spain
to the United States as a reasonable foundation for putting the
No Transfer policy into effect. In either case, however, national
security concerns and a bout of Anglophobia provided the
ultimate justification for the seizure of any portion or even all of
the Spanish Floridas. The "law of self-preservation" had replaced
a "rightful and legal claim," but the spirit of it all remained
unchanged. Throughout the remainder of 1811 and right up
to the outbreak of war with England in the spring of 1812, the
administration applied its West Florida policy-the peaceful and
voluntary request of the inhabitants of Florida, spurred, of course,
by furtive prodding from American circles, into, as Madison so
eloquently put it, "the bosom of the American family"-to Florida
east of Pensacola. Using the No Transfer Resolution as a pretext, as
a sort of congressional mandate for acquiring all of Florida in the
name of national security, the Madison administration employed
the clandestine services of General George Mathews and, when
that failed, of Georgia Governor David Mitchell to seize Amelia
Island and St. Augustine, the capital of East Florida. This unsavory
affair became known as the Patriot War, or more accurately, as one
scholar so aptly labeled it, the "other War of 1812." U. S. forces
briefly occupied Pensacola in 1814, destroyed Negro Fort on the
Apalachicola River in 1816, invaded Spanish Florida in 1818, and
wrested it by treaty in 1819-and all along, U. S. officials involved
in these events based their actions on the same language drafted by
the Madison administration as early as the summer of 1810.
The No Transfer policy eventually evolved into a viable and integral
feature ofU. S. foreign policy long after the acquisition of all of Spanish
Florida. The first step in this evolutionary process centered on the
promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and the correspondence that
accompanied the famous 1823 presidential statement. Here again, the
events erupting throughout Spanish America provided the foundation
for another round of official pronouncement of the No Transfer
principle. In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams notified the
Russian minister to the United States that the Monroe administration
"could not see with indifference, the forcible interposition of any
European Power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion
of Spain over her emancipated Colonies in America, or to establish
Monarchical Government in those Countries, or to transfer any of
the possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American
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Hemisphere, to any other European Power." With U. S. possession
of Florida, the island of Cuba emerged as the next great concern for
American national security, and, as expected, Anglophobia served
once again as a catalytic force. Also in 1823, Adams informed Hugh
Nelson, the U.S. minister to Spain, that the U.S. government feared
that the British would take advantage of Spain's continued weakness
and force a cession of the island to Great Britain, which the United
States would not tolerate. 38
Two years later, President John Quincy Adams's secretary of
state, Henry Clay, again invoked the No Transfer policy. Responding
to rumors of French seizure of Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, Clay
informed the French government in Octoberof1825 that the United
States "could not see, with indifference, those islands passing from
Spain to any other European power" and "could not consent to the
occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain
under any contingency whatever." The president, Clay instructed the
U.S. minister to France, "cannot suppose a state of things in which
either of the great maritime powers of Europe, with or without the
consent of Spain, would feel itselfjustified to occupy or attempt the
occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico without the concurrence or, at
least, the knowledge of the United States." Clay had connected the
No Transfer policy with the noncolonization and nonintervention
principles enunciated in Monroe's famous message of 1823. 39
38.

Adams to Baron Tuyll, October 16 and November 8, 1823, in Perkins, Monroe
Doctrine, 87-88, 203; Adams to Nelson, April 28, 1823, in Worthington C. Ford,
ed., Writings ofjohn Quincy Adams (New York: Macmillan Company, 1913-191 7),
7: 369-421.
39. Henry Clay to James Brown, October 25, 1825, ASP: FR, 5: 856; Dexter Perkins
contends that the declarations made by Adams and Clay "clearly indicate a
nexus between the no-transfer conception and the Monroe Doctrine," but the
statements "do not mark the clear development of a general principle" and that
"for a long time to come this principle, either expressly stated or even implied,
is absent from the American diplomatic documents." Dexter Perkins, The
Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907 (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 5-6. Some
scholars of the Monroe Doctrine include President James K. Polk's messages
of December 2, 1845, and April 29, 1848, as another evolutionary step in the
No Transfer policy, but Perkins argues that the first of Polk's declarations
"awakened comparatively little comment, and the second aroused perhaps
the bitterest criticism that has ever been expressed" in connection with the
Monroe Doctrine. "Furthermore, it is to be observed, neither the one message
nor the other deals with the type of situation most commonly connected with
the no-transfer corollary" as neither of the declarations concern the transfer
of sovereignty from a European power to another. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 6.
On Polk's corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine, see Dexter Perkins, The Monroe
Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 77-83, 174-78.
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Despite these diplomatic utterances, however, the No Transfer
principle remained for the next few decades in a rather embryonic
status. As one noted scholar declared correctly, it may be stated "with
some definiteness that the no-transfer corollary was very far from
fully developed in the period before the Civil War." The Republican
Party's expansionistic impulse in the years immediately following the
Civil War-acquisition of Alaska, negotiations with the Dominican
Republic, and efforts to annex Hawaii-finally linked the No
Transfer policy of 1811 with the principles outlined in the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823. The administration of Andrew Johnson fought the
possible transfer of the Danish West Indies to Austria in 1865 based
on this reasoning. The United States, declared Secretary of State
William H. Seward, "would not desire to see the islands in the hands
of any other power," and that "no transfer of colonies in West Indies
between European powers can be indifferent to the United States." 40
But the decisive steps in the evolution of the No Transfer policy
directly incorporating the principle into the Monroe Doctrine came
during the Grant administration. In response to the outbreak of
revolution on Spanish controlled Cuba, Grant declared in his 1869
annual message that "these dependencies are no longer regarded as
subject to transfer from one European power to another." Also in 1869,
Italy desired to transfer sovereignty of the island of St. Barthelemy to
Sweden, a possibility that Secretary of State Hamilton Fish warned
against as "adverse to that cardinal policy of the United States"
established in the Monroe Doctrine. Another instance instigating the
Grant administration to invoke the No Transfer policy arose from U.
S. efforts to annex the Dominican Repub1ic in 1869 and 1870 in the
wake of rumors that the North German Confederation would take
possession of the island, an action which the president himself asserted
to be simple "adherence to the 'Monroe Doctrine'." The doctrine
promulgated by President Monroe, Grant told congress, "has been
adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the
equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent
shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power." This was,
in the words of the historian Dexter Perkins, "the first statement of the
no-transfer concept in unqualified and entirely general terms by any
American statesman, most certainly by any American President."41
40.
41.

Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 8-11.
Ibid , 11-21. For Grant's message to congress, see Richardson, Messages and
Papers, 7: 61-63 .
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The formal wedding of the No Transfer policy to the Monroe
Doctrine, however, and thus the official acceptance of both as
keystones ofU. S. foreign policy, came with the Fish Memorandum
. of 1870, in which Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, in response
to a congressional inquiry about the state of U. S. commercial
relations with Latin America, seized the opportunity to elaborate
on the history of the Monroe Doctrine and to provide the most
"distinct affirmation of the no-transfer concept in general terms."
Although the secretary took some liberties with the historical
record, employing history as propaganda for promoting U.
S. foreign policy, Fish declared that the United States stood
"solemnly committed by repeated declarations and repeated acts"
to the Monroe Doctrine and "in its application to the affairs of
this continent. " In his annual message to congress, Fish continued,
President Grant, "following the teachings of all our history,"
stated that "the existing dependencies are no longer regarded
as subject to transfer from one European power to another....
This is not a policy of aggression; but it opposes the creation of
European dominion on American soil, or its transfer to other
European powers, and it looks hopefully to the time when, by the
voluntary departure of European governments from this continent
and adjacent islands, America should be wholly American." The
Madison administration and the authors of the 1811 No Transfer
Resolution could not have agreed more. 42
In the "mostspecific and definite language," therefore, Secretary
of State Fish connected inextricably the No Transfer principle with
those declared in the Monroe Doctrine. A "new landmark" had
been passed, conjectured Perkins, and the Fish Memorandum of
July 14, 1870, "has an historical importance not to be denied." The
pronouncement, moreover, not only incorporated the No Transfer
policy into the Monroe Doctrine, but "it is the starting-point for its
frequent application" in the decades that followed. Both Grant and
Fish were avowed proponents of the Monroe Doctrine, and their
immense appreciation for the principles outlined in Monroe's
1823 declaration necessarily and comfortably allowed them to add
the No Transfer policy as an essential ingredient of this antebellum
hallmark of U. S. foreign policy. In the final analysis, the 1870
Fish Memorandum merely ensconced the 1811 No Transfer
42.

Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 21-26. For the Fish Memorandum of 1870, see 41 "
Cong. , 2"d sess. , Senate Executive Document No. 112.
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Resolution as an integral and explicit foundation of American
foreign policy. Samuel Flagg Bemis, the renowned scholar of
U. S. diplomatic history, summed it up perfectly when he stated
that "like Washington's Farewell Address earlier and the Monroe
Doctrine later this was an historic contribution to the formulation
of a distinct American foreign policy." The events unfolding in
West Florida during the summer and fall of 1810, therefore,
proved just as important for the course of American history, and
specifically for the development of a distinct American foreign
policy, one that continued well into the 20th century. The original
Lone Star Republic established the precedent for the addition of
other stars to the blue canton of the Stars and Stripes. The Madison
administration's reaction to the West Florida revolt in 1810 and the
consequent passage of the No Transfer Resolution the following
year arguably set the standard for further American territorial
acquisition. Manifest Destiny commenced not with Tyler and Polk,
but with Jefferson and Madison, and Spanish West Florida, not
Texas or Mexico or Oregon, served as the beachhead. 43

43.

Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 25, 26; Samuel Flagg Bemis, john Quincy Adams and
the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949),
301. Bemis also asserted that the "No-Transfer Policy, stated in the diplomatic
documents ancillary to Monroe's message but not in the message itself, was
to become just as important a part of the Monroe Doctrine as the three dicta
proclaimed in that celebrated state paper. Older than the Doctrine itself, it
lay from the beginning in the same bed with the principles of the message. "
Bemis, Adams, 395. The historian George Dangerfield likewise connected
the No Transfer policy directly with the principles of noncolonization and
nonintervention espoused in Monroe's 1823 message. George Dangerfield,
The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1952) , 303.
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